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THE GEORGE A. LEET BUSINESS 
LAW SYMPOSIUM: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
DIRECTORS VS. SHAREHOLDERS? 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of the corporate governance debate began with the 
publication of The Modem Corporation and Private Property1 in 
1932. It announced to a surprised public the notion of separation of 
ownership and control; that is, the idea that the shareholders who, in a 
general sense, own the corporation do not actually control it. In eco-
nomic theory, the directors are the agents, and the executives mere 
subagents, of the shareholders. In fact, however, the executives, the 
managers, and the officers are the ones who really run the business 
and often do so to some extent for their own benefit rather than for 
the benefit of the shareholders. 
Enthusiasm for reform since then has waxed and waned. Not sur-
prisingly in the 1990s, with the stock market soaring and everybody 
making money, nobody pushed for fundamental changes in corporate 
governance. Then at the tum of the millennium we were hit by a 
number of corporate scandals-Enron, Tyco, et cetera. 
One disturbing aspect of those scandals was the absence of the 
boards of directors. Also disturbing was that by their composition 
and practices, these boards did not seem to be defective. In many 
respects they seemed to be at least average, if not above average 
boards of directors, yet they did not detect the scandals brewing 
within their own companies. 
Now the tide has shifted; there is a lot of agitation for reform. We 
have seen a number of changes as a result of that enthusiasm, the 
1 ADOLF AUGUSTUS BERLE, 'THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932). 
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most notable being the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 and changes to 
the listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASDAQ. We also see some initiatives in the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, most notably the proposal for Rule 14a-11,3 
which would enhance the role of shareholders in the nomination and 
election of directors. This symposium, therefore, occurs at an oppor-
tune time to discuss corporate governance. 
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